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ABSTRACT 
This bachelor thesis will present the assessed system of safety 
integrity level (SIL) on the storage tank of FRU. SIL is a measure 
of safety system performance or probability of failure on demand 
(PFD) for a SIF or SIS. The first step to determine SIL (Safety 
Integrity Level) by doing HAZOP (Hazard and Operation). 
HAZOP will analyze the failure and the cause of failure of the 
system. LOPA is Layer of Protection Analysis which aimed at 
determining the frequency of undesirable events, which certainly 
could have been prevented by a layer of protective installed. It is a 
consequence based method and the first start using the data from 
HAZOP report. Several steps must be done to determine the SIL 
number. The first step is to verify the SIS (Safety Instrumented 
System) by developing safety requirement for example ESD 
(Emergency Shutdown) and failure rates, and also perform SIS 
conceptual design by finding SFF (Safety Failure Factors) and the 
PFD (Probability of Failure on Demand) average of the logic solver 
and final element. And SIL number can be determined by the 
calculation. And the result of this bachelor thesis is the system, 
especially on storage tank, has met the requirement based on the 
standard. 
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ABSTRAK 
SIL adalah ukuran kinerja sistem keselamatan atau probabilitas 
kegagalan pada permintaan untuk SIF (Safety Instrumented 
Function) atau SIS (Safety Instrumented System). Nilai SIL yang 
akan dihitung adalah pada tangki penyimpanan FRU. Langkah 
pertama untuk menentukan SIL (Safety Integrity Level) dengan 
melakukan HAZOP (Hazard and Operation). HAZOP akan 
menganalisis kegagalan dan penyebab kegagalan sistem. LOPA 
adalah Lapisan Analisa Perlindungan yang bertujuan untuk 
menentukan frekuensi kejadian yang tidak diinginkan, yang 
tentunya bisa dicegah oleh lapisan pelindung terpasang. Ini adalah 
metode berdasarkan konsekuensi dan menggunakan data dari 
laporan HAZOP. Terdapat beberapa langkah yang harus dilakukan 
untuk menentukan jumlah SIL. Langkah pertama adalah untuk 
memverifikasi SIS dengan mengembangkan persyaratan 
keselamatan misalnya ESD (Emergency Shutdown)) dan tingkat 
kegagalan, dan juga melakukan SIS desain konseptual dengan 
mencari SFF (Safety Fraction Failure) dan PFD (Probability of 
Failure Demand) rata-rata. Dan jumlah SIL dapat ditentukan 
dengan perhitungan. Dan hasil dari tesis sarjana ini sistem, 
terutama pada tangki penyimpanan, telah memenuhi persyaratan 
berdasarkan standar. 
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The forecast of Indonesia’s domestic natural gas demand is 
bright. The upstream oil and gas authority, SKK MIGAS, 
estimates that domestic natural gas demand will grow by 5.1 
percent per year from 2.9 billion cubic feet per day (BCFD) 
in 2007 to 5.5 BCFD in 2020, fueled by new power 
generation and industry demand. Going forward, the 
country’s power needs will remain high, with more than 
10,000 megawatts of new capacity required by 2015 to 
prevent a long-term power crisis. The state-owned electricity 
company PLN plans to reduce production and operating 
costs by increasing natural gas use from 21 percent to 40 
percent by 2015. Therefore, the Indonesian government is 
looking at LNG as a promising solution to natural gas 
infrastructure problems. [1] 
 
Oil and gas industry performing petroleum and natural gas 
has a system on their product distribution after the drilling 
process and passed some stage such as separation and 
distillation, distribution from land after had some production 
steps will be distributing to tanker (offshore) that will export 
the product worldwide. On each step, there must be some 
risks of failure, on big industry continue failure is very 
common such as; a false trip alarm to the risk of explosion 
because of overflow or over pressure. Those failures are 
possible happening in every industry. However, the main job 
of the engineer is to minimize the risk and to prevent as if 






Safety system needed to protect the plan from major failure 
or minor failure that leads to dangerous failure. Safety 
Instrumented System (SIS) having an important role in 
serving layer protection system on each industry process to 
decrease the possible risk happening. The safety layer 
protection means emergency shut down or safety interlock 
to continue the safe state process when the predetermined set 
point if the safety operation condition violated. One of the 
recommended solutions is to determine the SIL (Safety 
Integrity Level) as the number that states the reliability of 
the asset. SIL a measure of the availability of a protection 
layer or barrier. Protection layers include critical alarms and 
human intervention, SIF (Safety Instrumented Functions), 
physical protection and emergency response. All these 
mitigate the frequency of the occurrence of the potential 
unwanted end-consequence or mitigate the impact the end-
consequence represents. Based on IEC 61511-1:2003 [2] 
safety integrity is the performance that can be done by SIS 
and SIF on every mode. 
 
Based on IEC 61508 [3] the step required to determine the 
SIL is doing HAZOP. HAZOP is a standard hazard analysis 
techniques used in the prepare the establishment of security 
on the new system or modifications to an existence of 
potential hazards or operation problem. As the asset existed, 
the following step is to verify the SIS (Safety Instrumented 
System) by develop the safety requirement and perform SIS 
conceptual design. And the last step to calculate the SIL 
number. 
 
On this final project will analyze the performance and the 
reliability of the protection system of the regasification unit 
focusing on storage tank F-6001. The safety level must meet 






1.2. STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS 
 
Based on description above, could be conclude some 
problems: 
1. The accretion of  failure number of LNG storage tank. 
2. Safety system for LNG storage tank that consists of 
HAZOP (Hazard and Operation), SIS (Safety 
Instrumented System) and SIL (Safety Integrity 
Level) should meet the IEC 61508 & IEC 61511. 
3. Determine SIL as the measure of the availability of a 
protection layer. 
 
1.3. PROBLEM LIMITATION 
 
Research limitations are: 
1. LNG distribution system does not include. 
2. The safety level only on storage tank F-6001. 
 
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of this bachelor thesis include : 
1. To observe the failure rate of the LNG storage tank on 
FRU based on standard IEC 61508 & IEC 61511. 
2. To analyze the safety system of the storage tank F-
6001 on the FRU. 
3. To determine the SIL (Safety Integrity Level) of the 
storage tank on FRU. 
 
1.5. RESEARCH BENEFITS 
 
Benefits could gain from this bachelor thesis are : 
1. Decrease the number of failure of existing LNG 
storage tank. 
2. The standard of safety system required based on IEC 
































2.1. REGASIFICATION UNIT 
 
FSRU (Floating Storage Regasification Unit) is special 
floating vessel that stores gas and regasifies the LNG 
(Liquefied Natural Gas). Studies on FSRU have been 
developed by many engineering and oil & Gas Company and 
some of them have been approved by ABS (American 
Bureau Standard). 
 
2.1.1. Step on Loading LNG 
 
Some steps must be done to loading the LNG start from LNG 
processing to LNG distribution. There are some unit must be 
passed, such as: 
 
a. LNG Storage 
 
This is the first step on loading process system start from 
Train 1-6 product the gas and change the gas into liquid 
form, this 6 train also to neutralize the LNG become pure 
from any other material. The production of LNG from 6 
trains will send to storage tank F-6001-5. The distribution 
line is shown in Figure 2. 1. 
 
The main pipe of the 6 train has a diameter of 20” and 
will connect to another tank. This parallel pipe divided 
into two part because there are the top and bottom input 
of the tank, so the main pipe will decline into 16” because 
the smaller diameter will help the LNG to flow upward 

















b. LNG Transfer 
 
Loading LNG Transfer to the vessel and the Loading and 
Circulating pump works because this loading process is 
the main job of the pipeline system of the Loading and 











Figure 2. 2 shows the loading process from the tank, pipe 
with the blue mark as the output. The pipe is the loading 
pipe to outside the tank by loading pump, the output ofI 
the tank is a pipe with diameter 48” and divided into 4, 
for each pipe with a diameter of 20” where the pump 
located. There are L-M-N pump (white) are the loading 
pump, the main job of this pump is to send the transfer 
flow  to the vessel, and the grey one is the Circulating 
pump. 
 
Circulating pump is to circulate the LNG to the whole 
part so the temperature of LNG is stable. The output of 3 
loading pump are 2 pipes with a diameter of 36”. As the 
diameter decrease will help  the flow rate of LNG as the 
loading process will faster. And then will come together 
to the pipe with a diameter of 30” that will continue to 
Berth. 
 
c. Berth and Loading Arm 
 
The last unit is Berth that directly contact with the vessel.  
There are 2 Berth for loading LNG, Berth 2&3. Each 
berth consists of 4 Loading Arm where 3 Loading Arm 
as the LNG distributor and the other Loading Arm as the 
waster of the vapor of loading from inside the vessel by 
burning process by marine flare. The main job of this unit 
to transfer the LNG to the storage inside the vessel, done 
by Loading Arm on Berth 2 & 3 as shown in Figure 2. 3. 
 
LNG flow to the berth by 2 pipes with a diameter of 24” 
and goes to Loading Arm that controlled by the on the 
operator room on each berth. Each pipe will protect from 
overpressure by Pressure safety valve. The process on 
berth is the end of loading process on storage tank, start 













In order to vaporize the LNG, there are a number of 
possible technologies and some of them are heated 
vaporizers, ambient vaporizers, and remote heated 
vaporizers. According to DNV, the heated vaporizer 
system uses a direct heat procedure with natural gas as 
fuel. The gas is combusted to get heat, which is used to 
vaporize the LNG. 
 
Since this system uses natural gas as fuel the result will 
be CO2 and pollutants in the air. The ambient vaporizers 
receive, according to DNV, the heat from naturally 
occurring sources. This could, for example, be air or sea 
water. A commonly used method is the open loop water-
based system where LNG is heated by seawater that is 
taken from the surrounding sea. After the sea water is 
consumed as the heating medium it is removed from the 
regasification unit and transferred overboard and back to 
the sea. 
 
This type of approach is possible as long as the 
surrounding sea is warm enough, which could be a 
problem when operating in the North Sea. Another 
concern with this type of vaporizer is that the water, after 
the heat exchanging process, will be heavily chilled. 
Therefore, the output water will be very cold in relation 
to the surrounding water, especially in a warmer climate.  
 
The environmental impact, both long term, and short 
term, of this cold water emission, needs to be 
considered for the area where it is supposed to 
















Tabel 2. 1 FSRU Particulars 
 
Length Overall 294 meter 
Breadth Moulded 46 meter 








Offshore Pipeline ± 21 km 
Pipeline 
Specification 
24” , API 5L (SAWL) X-65 
(PSL 2) 
  
Tabel 2. 1 shows the FRSU particulars data. FSRU 
location is close to the gas receiving and dividing station 
Labuan Maringgai or exactly at the coordinates 50 26' 
30"S and 1050 56' 30"E [4]. 
 
2.2. DATA OF STORAGE TANK F-6001 
 
Figure 2. 5 shows the Process Flow Diagram working 
system, and Figure 2. 6 shows the Piping and Instrument 
Diagrams for Storage Tank. The details of PFD of Process 
Storage Tank & Loading Pump shows in Figure 2. 7. From 
those several data then divided into some small part called 
ESD or emergency shutdown to detailing the analysis. ESD 
used are ESD 1, ESD 2, and ESD 3. The function of each 
ESD is supporting each ESD, for example, if ESD 1 failed 
to run the operation the will help by ESD 2. Moreover, if 
ESD 2 still cannot work to run the operation then ESD 3 will 
activate. In this final project will analyze the safety integrity 
level on the storage tank. Based on Figure 2. 8 the system 
will be divided into 3 nodes; Storage Tank Input, Storage 



































From the system on Figure 2. 5 to Figure 2. 8, some loading valve 
and the pump will be shut down/stop when a failure occurs, to 
perform SIL calculation requires the value of the overall failure 
rate of the process instruments which will be calculated on next 
stage. Figure 2. 5 shows the whole system of SIS and will divide 
into several categories based on SIS working on the system. The 
categories are divide into each class of SIS named ESD 
(Emergency Shutdown) such as ESD I, ESD II and III. Process 
Flow Diagram illustrating the ESD system, starting from storage. 
Berth ended with a tank that is part of the charging liquid LNG 
tanker headed offshore. On the Figure 2. 5 can be found that the 
entire system had some final element as security equipment. On 
each storage tank there is a safety valve that will close when 
danger occurs, continued on a storage pump that will stop working 
when the ESD is activated, on the calculation of the verification 
did not include the pump because these pumps work mechanically 
and difficult to get the reliability data, besides the final element in 
small scale. 
 
Storage tank LNG designed to store LNG at low temperature, -
162OC. This tank contains two storages, inner storage to store the 
LNG and the outside storage as the insulation material. On storage 
tank, the steam must be release or the pressure and temperature 
inside the tank will increase. To keep the pressure constant by 
releasing the boil-off gas (BOG) from the tank, this called auto-
refrigeration.  
 
The main characteristic of LNG storage tank is able to store LNG 
at very low temperature, lower than -162 ° C (-260 °F). The typical 
LNG storage tank is full containment tank, around 55 m (180 ft) 







In storage tank, if the pressure not releases, the pressure inside the 
tank will increase and the temperature inside the storage tank also 
increasing. LNG is cryogen and stored in the liquid phase at very 
low temperature. The temperature inside the tank should be 
constant Storage tank has the same function of thermos that 
insulates the heat inside the bottle. Storage tank to keep the low 
temperature -160 °C so the storage tank designed to keep the 
temperature inside stable and the LNG still in liquid form. 
 
Some variable changes on the operation of the storage tank: 
 
Flow : Flow change as the flow from the train the 
volume of LNG change to the production of 
LNG. 
Pressure : Normal operation pressure inside storage 
tank 700-1100mm 𝐻2𝑂 
Temperature : Normal operation temperature -159°C 
 
Control System process on storage tank has controlled by two 
systems, normally controlled by PT/PIC-6001A that will send the 
signal to compressor boil off control. And the other is PT/PIC – 
6002A that will release the excess pressure to the atmosphere if 
the normal control system failed to control. 
  
Alarm on storage tank that shows the high pressure by an 
instrument with tag number PH-6003A and low pressure by PL-
6003A. To high level on tank showed by LAH-6001A and low 
level showed by LAL-6001A. High temperature showed by TAH-
6002E 15/16 and for low temperature by TAL-6002AE-15/16. 
 
Storage Tank F-600 has maximum capacity 127000𝑚𝑚3 to 
receive the flow from train 4/5. The tank will full in 12 days when 
the filling of LNG from train 4/5 that will operate maximum 115% 






2.3. INSTRUMENT SYSTEM 
 
Instrument system is the hardware, software, and process. SIS (Safety 
Instrument System) is the instrumentation system that used to 
implemented one or more SIF (Safety Instrument Function). SIS consist 
of some component such as sensors, logic solvers, and final element that 
work to protect the system into a safe condition.SIF is a function of SIS 
as protector or controller to do the safety task.  




Figure 2. 9 General Instrument System 
 
2.4. HAZOP (HAZARD AND OPERABILITY) 
 
“A hazard evaluation of broad scope that identifies and 
qualitatively analyzes the significance of hazardous situations 
associated with a process or activity.” (Definition from Layer of 
Protection Analysis, Simplified Process Risk Assessment, pg. 
261). At this stage, HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) is 
used. HAZOP is a standard hazard analysis technique that used in 
the preparation to establish the security on the new system or 







HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on the GUIDE - WORDS 
And Implemented by a team during HAZOP Process For Example 
Instrument Engineering. To start HAZOP needed PFD / P&ID 
document from the unit that is going to be analyzed, it will be split 
into some stages according to the unit, there are Storage Tank and 
Loading Pump. By using HAZOP method can identify the 
possibility of a dangerous situation will occur, eventually the 
results will be HAZOP report. 
 
2.4.1. HAZOP Steps 
 
HAZOP will be explaining on the following step: 
 
a. Determination of Node 
 
Node is the point to mark the start and end point of the sub-
system. HAZOP study will do on each sub-system. 
 
b. Determination of Deviation 
 
Based on IEC 61882 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP 
studies) - Application guide, there are some deviation that 
might happened along the operation of the plan [6], such as: 
 
1. No Flow  
2. Low Flow  
3. More/High Flow  
4. Reverse/Misdirected Flow  
5. Low Level 
6. High Level 
7. Less/Low Pressure  
8. High Pressure  
9. Less/Low Temperature  






c. Determination of Parameter 
 
The parameter is the measure or limitation, also used to know 
as if the determined deviation will happen to each node. The 
parameter will be determined based on the deviation. Each 




The likelihood is the chance of LNG released to the 
environment because of leakage or PVS (Pressure Safety 
Valve) activated causing by overpressure.  
 
Table 2. 1 Likelihood Level [6] 
 
Likelihood Significance 
1 Low- hazard not expected at all in the plant 
life 
2 Medium low- hazard not expected more 
than once in the plant life 
3 Medium High – Hazard expected several 
times in plant life 
4 High – hazard expected more than 1/year 
 
Table 2. 1 shows the likelihood level of leakage. The 
likelihood level classified by the hazard consequence. The 
lowest likelihood is level 1 which indicate the lower risk of 
consequence or by mean the hazard not expected to cause 
fatality. Following by moderate level 2, level 3 and the highest 
level is likelihood level 4 with hazard consequences could 
causing fatality or damage more than 1/years.  
 
To correctly assign these levels, it is important to recognise 






e. Severity Analysis 
 
Severity is the effect that might happen when the LNG 
released to the air. There are 3 possible effects that might be 
happened, for example to the human, to the operation and the 
financial effect. Table 2. 2 shows the severity level and its 
effect. Table 2. 3 shows the description of injury effect to the 
operator. 
 
Table 2. 2 Severity Level [6] 
 
Severity Significance 
1 Low- no Injury hazard or hazard leading to 
loss of <1 weeks production or loss less than 
$100.000 
2 Medium Low- minor injury hazard or hazard 
leading to loss of 1-4 weeks production or loss 
between $0,1-1M 
3 Medium High- Injury hazard or hazard 
leading to loss of 1-6 months production or 
loss between $1-10M 
4 High- fatality/ serious injury hazard or hazard 
leading to loss of > 6 months production or 
loss greater than $ 10M 
 
Table 2. 3 Severity Description [6] 
 
Category Description 
No injury hazard - No burn 
Minor injury - Minor burn 
Injury hazard - First-degree burn 
Fatality/serious injury - Death occurs when accident occurred 
- Third degree burn 







f. Risk Ranking 
 
The risk is when  the cause of risk meets the source of risk. 
Table 2. 4. shows the risk ranking and the definition based on 
their ranking. 
 
Table 2. 4 Risk Definition [6] 
 
Ranking Significance 
A Acceptable Risk Level 
B Almost Acceptable level risk. Acceptable if 
suitably controlled by management. Should 
check that suitable procedure and/or control 
systems are in place 
C Undesirable risk level. Must be reduced to 
level B at the most by engineering or 
management control 
D Unacceptable risk level. Must be reduced to 












Figure 2. 10 shows the matrix used. If the risk level that 
happened is 1 or 2 it should be reduced to risk level 3. To 
reduce the risk level can be done by adding more safety 
equipment and SIL analysis to analyze the availability of the 
recommended safety tools. And Figure 2. 11 shows the relation 




Figure 2. 11 Risk Matrix of Likelihood and Severity [7] 
 
2.5. THE LAYER PROTECTION ANALYSIS (LOPA) 
 
The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) method is a Process 
Hazard Analysis tool modified LOPA can be considered as a 
simplified form of a quantitative risk assessment. It can be used 
after a hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), and before a 
quantitative risk analysis (QRA). A difference between LOPA and 
other tools is that LOPA analyze the different protection layers 
individually, and the mitigation they lead to. LOPA is especially 
used to determine the safety integrity level (SIL) of safety 
instrumented functions in conjunction with IEC 61511 [2], but 
also as a general risk assessment tool to evaluate if the protection 
layers in a system are satisfactory. In addition, several other 
applications of LOPA as capital improvement planning, incident 
investigation and management of change and the method was 
implemented internationally. 
  
4 A C D D 4 4 8 12 16
3 A B C D 3 12 6 9 12
2 A A B C 2 24 4 6 8
1 A A A B 1 24 2 3 4


















In gas/oil industry LOPA is more frequently applied to topside 
equipment than subsea equipment. The LOPA method allows the 
user to determine the risk associated with the various hazardous 
events by utilizing their severity and the likelihood of the events 
being initiate. 
 
The method starts with data developed in the Hazard and 
Operability analysis (HAZOP) and accounts for each identified 
hazard by documenting the Initiating Cause and the protection 
layers that prevent or mitigate the hazard.  
 
Figure 2. 12 illustrate the relationship between HAZOP and LOPA 
Worksheets. HAZOP worksheet cells equal to cells in LOPA 
report, and automatic transformation of data [8]. This applies to: 
 
 HAZOP consequence indicates impact event on LOPA 
worksheet 
 HAZOP possible causes indicates initiating causes on 
LOPA worksheet 
 HAZOP consequence likelihood indicates initiating cause 
frequency on LOPA worksheet (Note: may need 
adjustment) 
 HAZOP consequence severity level indicates Severity 
level on LOPA worksheet (Note: May need adjustment) 
 
The total value of risk reduction can be determined and need more 
risk reduction analysis. If additional risk reduction is required and 
be provide in the form of a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF), 
the LOPA methodology allows the determination of the 














Table 2. 5 SIL and Required Safety System performance for Low Demand 
Mode System [8] 
 
Mode Low Demand Rate 
SIL Availability PFD RRF 
4 >99.99 % 10-5 s/d 10-4 100000 s/d 10000 
3 99.90 – 99.99 % 10-4 s/d 10-3 10000 s/d 1000 
2 99.00 – 99.90 % 10-3 s/d 10-2 1000 s/d 100 
1 90.00 – 99.00 % 10-2 s/d 10-1 100 s/d 10 
 
Table 2. 5 shows that the greater PFD number of the system need 
a high level of safety. In another word the greater failure, the 
greater level of safety to make sure that the plan is safe to operate. 
It also shows that the plan needs more safety system to secure the 
system from failure. 
 
In IPL (Independent Layer Protection) stacked layer stacks are 
applied to minimize the unwanted circumstances, the layer will 
backup the other layers so that the system will be more secure to 
reduce the level of risk as low as possible up to the limit tolerated. 
In this LOPA IPL method is divided into 7 types with two main 
categories as listed in Table 2. 6. 
 
Table 2. 6 Distribution of IPL Categories in LOPA 
 
IPL (Independent Protection Layer) 
Prevention Mitigation 
Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4 Layer 5 Layer 6 Layer 7 










From Table 2. 6 is divided into two main categories, Prevention 




Prevention is the category that used to the 4 initial layer. 
There are 4 layers to prevent the occurrence of a failure, 
with 4 categories on layer works as a deterrent and will back 
up to each other in case of failure in one layer. The category 
of prevention are: 
 
 BPCS; Basic Process Control System including normal 
manual control, is the first level of protection during 
normal operation. BPCS is designed to maintain the 
process in the area of safe operation. Normal operation 
BPCS control loop can be credited as an IPL if it meets 
the appropriate criteria. 
 
 Alarm; In terms of actual operation alarm is not 
included in the IPL, but because Alarms should inform 
the operator if a failure occurs, the alarm may have some 
importance because the operator will not respond if the 
layer is not activated. 
 
 Operator; Someone who control and supervise the 
process called the operator, in this case, the operator will 
take over the action to restore the plant to a safe state in 
the event of failure. The role of the operator as the IPL 
is very important for operators to be the one in control 







 SIS; Safety instrumented system into a final layer in this 
category. SIS will be active when the BPCS and the 
operator have failed to take over and bring in a safe 
condition. SIS works automatically without any 
interference from the operator, the system will actively 
be protective in the event of circumstances outside the 
specified tolerance. 
 
b. Mitigation  
 
Mitigation is carried out when the IPL category on 
Prevention has failed to take over. Mitigation works when a 
failure has occurred, with this mitigation will seek to 
minimize possible casualties or damage to the plant. 
 
The main difference between Prevention and Mitigation is 
when the Prevention works to prevent the failure by 
minimizing the possibility of failure, but Mitigation works 
when it happened and Prevention has failed, Mitigation 
works to minimizing the number of losses incurred. This 
category is divided into 3 IPL are: 
 
 Passive Device; Passive devices to prevent many losses 
such as relieve Pressure Valve that will work when 
excess pressure and SIS are not able to take over, 
causing leakage by the pressure then PSV will release 
these pressures so that losses can be reduced. 
 
 Outside Passive; On Passive Outside is more directed 
at preventing losses, for example, is a Bunkers as the 
protection of workers when there has been a blast, with 







 Emerge; The final step in the event of failure of the plant 
such as blast then performed the last time all the IPL has 
failed to take over is to make the evacuation status to all 
workers at the plant to immediately leave the plant to 
reduce the occurrence of victims. 
 
With the IPL, the next need HAZOP report of the possible 
likelihood of failure on several systems and grouped in IPL 
that will take over if the occurrence of a failure. After 
getting the results of the IPL table LOPA for determining 
the amount and many types of IPL then it can be done 
signifies the end of the process this method. And the result 
of the LOPA is LOPA worksheet based on HAZOP. 
 
2.6. INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYER (IPL) 
 
Independent Protection Layer is a tool, system, or action to exceed 
the consequence on the unwanted scenario. The tools are known 
as IPL is meet the requirement: 
 
a. Effective to prevent the planned consequences. 
b. One similar case to one or more equipment. 
c. Checked and assumed to effective prevent the consequences. 
 
Table 2. 7 Typical Probability of PFD value [9] 
 
No Independent Protection Layer (IPL) PFD 
1 Pressure relief device 10-2 
2 Operator Response (educated, no stress) 10-2 
3 Operator Response (Under high stress, average 
training) 
5x10-1 
4 Operator response to alarms and procedures (low 







2.7. SAFETY LIFE CYCLE 
 
Safety life cycle is engineering process that contains about 
required steps needed to accomplish the high safety level 
functionally, design, plan, operation and Safety Instrumented 
System maintenance. An automation system that has been plan 
based on required term and decrease the failure risk    on industry 
process. Safety life cycle starts with the conceptual design of a 
process and ends if the SIS decommissioned. 
 
The key to this idea is that we must consider that safety must be 
the plan from the beginning of the conceptual design of the process 
and should be at every design, operation, and maintenance. Safety 
life cycle has 3 phase that can be identified as analysis (risk 
analysis), realization (part of the asset), and operation. Safety life 










As shown in Figure 2. 13 that to accomplish high safety level there 
are 3 phase that should be done. But on this final project only 
consist of analysis and realization only. 
 
On the Chapter 3 will explain more about the details. On Figure 2. 
14 more detail step will be explained. Basically, this final project 




Figure 2. 14 Safety Life Cycle Based on IEC 61508 Standards [3] 
 
Figure 2. 14 above shows the safety life cycle based on IEC 61508 







1. Conceptual process design 
 
This is the first step on safety life cycle step. On this step, we 
study more about the detail of the process, controllable asset, 
and the environments. So that next steps able to be done. 
 
2. Hazard analysis and risk assessment 
 
The next step is understanding all about risk in the process, this 
can be done by hazard analysis and risk assessment. Hazard 
analysis is identifying the risk of the asset, some technique that 
can we use are Hazop, fault tree, and checklist. Risk assessment 
is giving grade/rank based on the hazard analysis. 
 
3. Application of non-SIS layers 
 
We can not get 100% safety on the asset by design, the rest of 
the risk can be handled by non-SIS equipment for the control 
system. 
 
4. Is SIS required? 
 
If the rest of the risk can be handled by non-SIS equipment so 
the safety level can be accepted, the SIS design stops at this 
step. If there the risk level is still high, SIS equipment is 
needed. 
 
5. Define target SIS 
 
SIS equipment should meet the risk level. In another word, to 
handle higher risk level we also need better SIS equipment. The 







6. Develop safety requirement specification 
 
The next step is to develop safety requirement specification 
which contains the functional logic of the system. Every safety 
function should connect to the SIL requirement and reliability 
requirement. This specification for every operation, from 
startup to shutdown. 
 
7. SIS conceptual design 
 
This step is developing an initial design to check as if the design 
meet the safety requirement and SIS performance requirement. 
This steps also about choosing the technology, configuration, 
interval testing, field devices and logic box. 
 
2.8. SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM (SIS) 
 
The operation process of industrial have a great risk due to 
presence of dangerous material, chemical, gases, and the others.  
A safety instrumented system (SIS) can dramatically reduce the 
risk of accident in industrial process. 
 
Safety Instrument System is a system composed of sensors, logic 
solver, and final element that have function to secure the system 
in case of a defiant operation not to endanger people, environment, 
and assets. Figure 2. 15 shows the Safety Instrument System (SIS) 
















2.8.1. Sensors  
 
The sensor is a device or combination of devices that used to 
measure the process condition such as transmitters, 
transducers, process switches or position switches. Sensor used 
to convert physical quantities into electrical quantities that can 
be analyzed by using an electric circuit. 
 
2.8.2. Logic Solver 
 
The logic solver is a processor of the electric signal that sent 
from a sensor or more to be processed and produce electric 
signals to be sent to the final element. An example of the logic 
solver includes the electrical system, electronic system, 
programmable electronic system, pneumatic system, and 
hydraulic systems. 
 
2.8.3. Final Element  
 
The final element is part of the SIS which function is to take 
action to reach a safe condition. The final element is valves, 
switch gear, motors, solenoid valve, and actuator. 
 
2.8.4. SIS Design 
 
SIS design is made to meets the requirement IEC 61508 on 
Safety Life Cycle as guidance to SIS design. On this SIS design 
only has plan and design, do not continue to installation and 
operation stage, so it is only about analysis and realization. 
Data needed to complete this stage are some detail data about 
the LNG, specification of the storage tank, and the specification 












2.8.5. Conceptual Process Design 
 
The process occurs in storage that will proceed to the port through the 
pump as a medium that delivers the LNG through pipelines. Loading 
Pump Storage Tank and has the specs of each listed in Table 2.8 to 2.10 
Table 2. 8 Specification of LNG 
Specification LNG 
Form Liquid 
Density 430 – 478 kg/m3 
Mocular Weight 16,58 – 18,88 kg/mol 
Nitrogen 1,24 max % mol 
Hidrogen Sulfide (H2S) 5,0 max % mg/nm3 
Temperature (-158) – (-162)oC 
 
Table 2. 9 Specification of LNG Storage Tank 
Specification of LNG Storage Tank 
Tag no F-6001 
Description LNG Storage Tank 
Capacity 800.000BBL (127000 m3) 
MAWP 2.0 PSG (0,4 kg/cm2G) 
Insulation Cold (1000 mm Perlite) 
Diameter x High 7000 mm x 35760 mm 
 
Table 2. 10 Specification of LNG Loading Pump 
Specification LNG Loading Pump 
Tag no G-6801 
Description LNG Loading Pump 
Flow 12.000GPM (2,724 m3/h) 
Diff Pressure 97,0 PSI (6,82 kg/cm2) 
SG 0,465 
Motor 1000 HP (735 KW) 
Casing 356 AL_- ALLOY 






Based on data process and the specification above, flow chart on 
Storage Loading Facilities is done. Conceptual design is completed, 
data is completed so the next step can ben done based on this 
conceptual design. 
 
2.8.6. Verification SIS (Safety Instrumented System) 
 
Verification of SIS aims to find out what is the SIL achieved, and the 
value of SIL represented the security level of the plant. The smaller the 
value of SIL, the greater the risk that would be obtained in the event of 
a catastrophic. The greater the value SIL means the ability to reduce 
the level of risk the better. The appropriate standard of IEC 61058 [3] 
is a method on the Safety of Life Cycle as a guide to verify the SIS. By 
analyzing the SIL of the SIS is intended to determine the value of 
existing systems. Some numbers of failure factors as consider the 
existing system. Verification of the SIS shows on the Safety of Life 
Cycle flow chart on  Figure 2.14. 
 
 
Figure 2. 17 Flow Chart for SIS Verification [3] 
The step of Figure 2.17 above, develop safety requirement and perform 






2.8.6.1. Develop Safety Requirement 
 
To perform the verification analysis on Safety Instrumented System 
that must be done by collect some data that contains specifications, 
instrument number, piping systems, process systems and another 
data. Most of the data obtained from the P&ID that contains a 
complete description of a process and the control of a unit. All of the 
data collected will be analyzed and classified into several categories 
according to running processes. At SIS analysis requires also the 
value of each instrument failure rate SIS on the field, this value will 
be calculated to obtain the value of SIL.  
 
2.8.6.2. Perform SIS (Safety Instrumented System) Conceptual 
Design 
 
SIS verification has some method; one of them is Simplified Method. 
In this case, Simplified Method will be used because it is easy to do. 
Simplified Method is a method used for verification and cannot be 
separated from the main elements of this method is PFD (Probability 
Failure on Demand) number. PFD is a failure number that owned by 
the equipment when it needs to work. For example, failure to activate 
an alarm when desired, or failure of the control valve to close when 
it is desirable to close. The numbers are usually expressed in units 
per year (760 hours). Based on ABB, he achievable SIL (Safety 
Integrity Level) is determined by the following safety-related 
parameters: 
 
o The fraction of failures 
 
The safety of failures do not have the potential to put the 
safety-related system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state 
(SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) 







𝑆𝐹𝐹 =  
𝜆𝑆+𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝑆𝑈+𝜆𝐷𝑈+𝜆𝐷𝐷
   (2. 1) 
 Where: 
λS : Failure Safe 
λDD : Failure Danger Detected 
λDU : Failure Danger Undetected 
 
To detailing the cause of failure, the Failure rate on the failure 
of an equipment divided into 2 parts, fail safe (𝜆𝑆) and fail 
danger (λD). The definition of failure safe or “if failure, then 
safe” is if the failure happened on the equipment it will not 
affect to the equipment or the system. Based on IEC 61508 the 
definition of Fail safe is a failure that does not have the 
potential for system leads to dangerous conditions, so when the 
failure does not potentially to be harm but still be calculated 
for a safety of an equipment. Practically failure safe divided 
into 2 section,  fail safe detected (𝜆𝑆𝑆) and fail safe undetected 
(𝜆𝑆U). The diagnose of fail safe detected and fail safe 
undetected doing by logic solver. 
 
Based on IEC 61508 fail danger is a failure that has the 
potential for a safety system into the dangerous condition. That 
means even a small failure but potentially to be harm to the 
equipment or the system. Fail danger also divided into 2 
section, fail danger detected (𝜆𝐷𝐷) and fail danger undetected 
(𝜆𝐷U). Failure danger undetected is very dangerous, because 
the failure happened is not detected on logic solver but the 
failure might lead to another failure. 
 
From the failure safe and failure danger only diagnosed by the 
logic solver. These two data is very important to influence the 
reliability and SIL number of SIF. 
 
SIL verification by using Simplified Method without 





system. The main term used in that calculation is PFDavg that 
can get from Failure Mode on each device. The calculation of 
each element of SIF can lead to the SIL number of a system, 
this SIL number determine if the system meets the requirement 
of the IEC standard. The system has Low Demand category 
because the demand frequency operation of the safety system 
is not more than one for each year, and not more than two times 
of proof test frequency. The Low Demand has own 
requirement based on IEC shown on Table 2.11 
 
Table 2. 11 SIL and Required Safety System Performance for Low Demand Mode 
System [3] 
Mode Low Demand Rate 
SIL Availability PFD RRF 
4 >99.99 % 10-5 s/d 10-4 100000 s/d 10000 
3 99.90 – 99.99 % 10-4 s/d 10-3 10000 s/d 1000 
2 99.00 – 99.90 % 10-3 s/d 10-2 1000 s/d 100 
1 90.00 – 99.00 % 10-2 s/d 10-1 100 s/d 10 
 
o Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) 
 
In this unit, the valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) 
= 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve on ESD, 
which has 1/1, it means the use of the single channel, a single 
error that occurred can directly lead to device failure. The 
greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure 
that occurs will not directly lead to failure of the asset. The 









Table 2. 12 Architecture Type A 
Type A 0 1 2 
< 60 % SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 
60 % < 90 % SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4 
90% < 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4 
> 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4 
 
o Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function 
on demand (PFDavg). 
 
Determine the value of the PDF (probability of failure on 
demand) of the components that support the same safety 
system on the node. PFDavg value as the main element of the 
calculation, while the value obtained from the equation 
PFDavg meet the standard of the architecture of a system, 
because the ESD unit is activated via a push button that located 
in the control room storage loading facilities, With the flow of 
the Push Button - Logic Solver - Final Elements, then the 
system goes into the category of system 1/1 (1 out of 1) and 
the equation used to PFDavg is: 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔 − 1001 ∶  
1(𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑥 𝑇𝐼)
2
  (2.2) 
Where; 
PFDavg : PFD average 
λDU  : Failure Mode Danger Undetected 









The calculation by using Simplified Method need the equation 
of: 
 




PFD𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝐹 : PFD average of SIF 
∑PFD𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑆 : PFD average of Logic Solver 
∑PFD𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐹𝐸 : PFD average of Final Elements 
 
Based on the calculation above, the result of this calculation is the SIL 
number of the storage tank. 
 
2.9. SAFETY INSTRUMENT FUNCTION (SIF) 
 
A set of equipment intended to reduce the risk due to a specific hazard (a 
safety loop). Its purpose is to 1. Automatically taking an industrial 
process to a safe state when specified conditions are violated; 2. Permit 
a process to move forward in a safe manner when specified conditions 
allow (permissive functions); or 3. Taking action to mitigate the 
consequences of an industrial hazard. It includes elements that detect an 
accident is imminent, decide to take action, and then carry out the action 
needed to bring the process to a safe state. Its ability to detect, decide and 
act is designated by the safety integrity level (SIL) of the function. Safety 
instrument function is the function of safety instrument system to reduce 
or minimize the consequence from operating deviation. The 
consequences can effect the loss of financial, fatalities, environment or 









2.10. SAFETY INTEGRATED LEVEL (SIL) 
 
The SIL is a measure of the availability of a protection layer or barrier. 
Protection layers include critical alarms and human intervention, safety 
instrumented functions (SIF), physical protection and emergency 
response. All these mitigate the frequency of the occurrence of the 
potential unwanted end-consequence or mitigate the impact the end-
consequence represents. Based on IEC 61511-1:2003 [2] safety integrity 
is the performance that can be done by SIS and SIF on every mode. 
 
SIL is the equipment/system that designed to monitor the dangerous 
conditions on a plant and takes action in case of hazardous conditions or 
if not taking any action it will cause harm. Equipment/systems will 
produce output that will prevent the hazard or reduce the consequences. 
In general, the SIS is composed of sensors, logic solver or also called 
safety and final control element. 
 
There are four discrete integrity levels associated with SIL. The higher 
the SIL level, the lower the probability of failure on demand for the safety 
system and the better the system performance. It is important to also note 
that as the SIL level increases, typically the cost and complexity of the 











    
The benefits of this bachelor thesis which determines the SIL some 
following step must be done as shown in Figure 3.1 Methodology 
Flowchart (next page). This chapter will describe step by step how to 
determine the safety Integrity level by using a layer of protection analysis 
method. The final result of this bachelor thesis are the safety level and 
the recommendation to fulfill the safety level. 
 
3.1. STUDY LITERATURE 
 
The first step is study literature. In this step can be done by searching and 
studying about something that related to the problems. Literature studies 
also can be done by reviewing the paper or a journal dealing with the 
problems to be solved. 
 
3.2. DATA COLLECTION 
 
From study literature, to solve the problem existed in this final project 
need some data, such as: 
 
1. P&ID of the system 
2. Failure Rates table 
 
The data are taken from the company and used to analyze the plan. 



















Verification SIS (Safety Integrated 
System)






Figure. 3.1 Methodology Flowchart 
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3.3. HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) 
HAZOP is a standard hazard analysis techniques used in the prepare the 
establishment of security on the new system or modifications to an 
existence of potential hazards or operation problem. To start HAZOP 
needed PFD / P&ID document from the unit that is going to be analyzed, 
it will be split into some stages according to the unit. 
3.3.1. HAZOP Steps 
HAZOP detail will be explained on the following step: 
a. Determination of Node
Node is the point to mark the start and end point of the sub-
system. HAZOP study will do on each sub-system. 
b. Determination of Deviation
Based on IEC 61882 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP 
studies) - Application guide [5]. 
c. Determination of Parameter
The parameter is the measure or limitation, also used to know as 
if the determined deviation will happen to each node. The 
parameter of each deviation of every node will different. 
d. Likelihood
The likelihood is the chance of LNG released to the environment 
because of leakage or PVS (Pressure Safety Valve) activated 
because of overpressure. Based on the presentation of Daniel R. 
Lewin Hazard and Operability Studies [6]. 
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e. Severity Analysis
Severity is the effect that might happen when the LNG released 
to the air. There are 3 possible effects that might be happened, 
for example to the human, to the operation and the financial 
effect. 
f. Risk Ranking
The risk is when  the cause of risk meets the source of risk. Risk 
based on the presentation of Daniel R. Lewin Hazard and 
Operability Studies categorized into 4 classes [6]. 
The output of HAZOP is a report, HAZOP worksheet will  be used to 
complete LOPA worksheet. Data can be further seen in attachment 1. 
3.4. LOPA (LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS)
LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) is an analysis method that works 
on the placement of protection layers to protect the plant adjusted to the 
possibility of what might happen if the plant in danger [8]. LOPA method 
used after completing HAZOP because the output results of HAZOP 
report on this method as the placement of protective layer to protect the 
plant. Layers of protection are Independent, means that if one layer has 
a problem then it will not affect the other layers so that there are still 
some others protective layer to anticipate. 
3.5. SIS (SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM) DESIGN 
SIS design is made to meets the requirement IEC 61508 on Safety Life 
Cycle as guidance to SIS design. On this SIS design only has a plan and 
design, do not continue to installation and operation stage, and only about 
analysis and realization. Data needed to complete this stage are some 
detail data about the LNG, specification of the storage tank, and the 
specification of loading pump. 
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3.5.1. Conceptual Process Design 
Research on the Storage Loading facilities, especially on storage and 
loading liquid LNG. This unit has divided into some parts, which are 
Storage Tank, Liquid LNG Storage and Loading Pump that will carry the 
LNG to the last part (Berth or port) where the LNG transfers from 
onshore to the LNG vessel. 
3.6.VERIFICATION SIS (SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM) 
Verification of SIS aims to find out what is the SIL achieved, and the 
value of SIL represented the security level of the plant. The smaller the 
value of SIL, the greater the risk that would be obtained in the event of a 
catastrophic. 
3.6.1. Develop Safety Requirement 
To perform the verification analysis on Safety Instrumented System that 
must be done by collect some data that contains specifications, 
instrument number, piping systems, process systems and another data. 
Most of the data obtained from the PFD that contains a description of a 
process and the control of a unit. All of the data collected will be analyzed 
and classified into several categories according to running processes. At 
SIS analysis requires also the value of each instrument failure rate SIS 
on the field, this value will be calculated to obtain the value of SIL.  
3.6.2. Perform SIS (Safety Instrumented System) Conceptual 
Design 
SIS verification has some method; one of them is Simplified Method. In 
this case, Simplified Method will be used because it is easy to do. 
Simplified Method is a method used for verification and cannot be 
separated from the main elements of this method is PFD (Probability 
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Failure on Demand) number. PFD is a failure number that owned by the 
equipment when it needs to work. For example, failure to activated alarm 
when desired, or failure of the control valve to close when it is desirable 
to close. To determine SIL need some calculation of SFF and PFD. Based 
on ABB, he achievable SIL (Safety Integrity Level) is determined by the 
following safety-related parameters: 
o The fraction of failures
Safety of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-
related system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state (SFF).  
o Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT)
The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure 
that occurs will not directly lead to failure of the asset. 
o Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on
demand (PFDavg)
Determine the value of the PDF (probability of failure on demand) 
of the components that support the same safety system on the node. 
PFDavg value as the main element of the calculation, while the 
value obtained from the equation PFDavg meet the standard of the 
architecture of a system. 
3.7. SIL (SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL) TARGET 
As follows the standard used by the IEC as an international organization 
that forms the standard of safety and followed by the entire world, in the 
standard IEC 61 058 EN 1473 : 2007 states "Standard required value of 
SIL 3 is EN 1473 : 2007, Installation of equipment for Liquefied Natural 
Gas - Design onshore installation, requiring SIL 3 systems for 
Emergency Shut Down Valve" [3]. “Discrete level (one out of a possible 
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four) for specifying the probability of a SIS satisfactorily performing the 
required SIF under all of the stated conditions within a stated period of 
time.” (Definition from ICM-DU-6025). Based on these standards, the 
authors follow that the entire SIF, SIS on the system to be made must 
meet SIL 3 value in terms of architecture, design, and the level of 
security. 
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In this chapter, the results of the analysis and verification of the existing 
SIS and SIS design of the new design will be explained in detail. 
Previously described prior analysis and verification of the SIS long, and 
after concluding the result will be explained in the design and analysis of 
the new SIS system 
4.1. STUDY LITERATURE 
The first step is study literature. In this step can be done by searching and 
studying about something that related to the problems. Literature studies 
also can be done by reviewing the paper or a journal dealing with the 
problems to be solved. Table 1.1 show the result of study literature 
reviewing.  
Table 4. 1 Study Literature Result 
Literature Review 
ABB Guideline to the calculation step 
IEC 61508 Guideline to step required 
Layer of protection analysis 
(LOPA) for determination of 
safety integrity 
Guideline to analyze the layer 
4.2. HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) 
HAZOP has the scenario and condition of the running operation of the 
unit, so based on several variable measured will cause a different effect 
on each running system. Also based on HAZOP the previous condition 
of the asset can be known as if it has not reached the safety level 
requirement. The previous system does not have many layers of 
protection on several conditions, mostly it only has BPCS and PSV on 
pressure and overflow. With this condition the system needs more layer 
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of protection before sharply reaching the mitigation, the hazardous event 
happened and become too risky if the simple layer used to the system. 
4.2.1. HAZOP Steps 
HAZOP detail will be explained on the following step: 
a. Determination of Node
Node is the point to mark the start and end point of the sub-
system, on this plan, there are 3 subsystems consist of: 
1. Storage Tank Input
2. Storage Tank Process
3. Storage Tank Output 1
4. Storage Tank Output 2
HAZOP study will do on each sub-system. 
b. Determination of Deviation
Based on IEC 61882 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP 
studies) - Application guide [5], there are 8 deviations that might 










c. Determination of Parameter
The parameter is the measure or limitation, also used to know as 
if the determined deviation will happen to each node. So each 
node will have its own HAZOP based on 8 determined deviation, 
but the parameter of each deviation of every node will different. 
d. Likelihood
The likelihood is the chance of LNG released to the environment 
because of leakage or PVS (Pressure Safety Valve) activated 
because of overpressure. Based on the presentation of Daniel R. 
Lewin Hazard and Operability Studies [6]. 
e. Severity Analysis
Severity is the effect that might happen when the LNG released 
to the air. There are 3 possible effects that might be happened, for 
example to the human, to the operation and the financial effect.  
f. Risk Ranking
The risk is when  the cause of risk meets the source of risk. Risk 
based on the presentation of Daniel R. Lewin Hazard and 
Operability Studies [6] categorized into 4 classes as mentioned in 
Chapter 2. Risk ranking determined from risk matrix. The risk 
matrix is the combination of likelihood number on the left side 
and severity number on the bottom. The example of risk matrix 
shown in Figure 2.11. 
The output of HAZOP is a report; HAZOP worksheet will be used to 
complete LOPA worksheet. Data can be further seen in attachment 2. 
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Figure 4. 1 HAZOP Worksheet 
The output of HAZOP is a report, for example in Figure 4.1. HAZOP 
worksheet will  be used to complete LOPA worksheet. HAZOP analysis 
and the risk analysis shown in attachment 3. 
4.3. LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) focuses on the risk reduction effort 
towards the impact event and provide rational basis to allocate risk 
reduction resources efficiently. It is a consequence based method and 
first start using the data from HAZOP output and suggest screening 
values and methodology account for further risk reduction for each 
safeguard. Mitigated risk for impact event can be compared with the 
Clients criteria for unacceptable risk. The additional Independent 
Protection Layer (IPL) can then be added and required safety integrity 
level (SIL) for SIS can be determined. 
On storage tank has some hazardous condition on some spot. On input 
and output has some flow parameter can possibly lead to hazardous 
condition and BPCS as first protection layer set up to cover the failure. 
If BPCS failed to cover, Alarm that operated by the operator will take 
place to cover it. If Alarm still failed SIS will replace the Alarm by using 
an automatic system to close the valve and isolated the flow so the flow 
will run normally again. If the system has some condition that SIS cannot 
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handle, Passive Device will take place over SIS, but this situation also is 
known as mitigation to reduce the effect of the hazard. 
The next step is to categorize based on new IPL. IPL should protect the 
plant from a hazardous situation. The more layer, the safer the plant. Each 
layer of protection can be the backup if the previous layer cannot cover 
the failure. This layer goes on from prevention to the mitigation. This 
conditions can reduce the number of casualties if the hazardous situation 
happened. (LOPA worksheet can be found on attachment. Table 4.2 
shows the LOPA of storage tank input. 
Table 4. 2 LOPA of Storage Tank Input 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) - Storage Tank Input 






1 Flow None 
Empty Pipe 
BPCS - - - 
2 Flow Less 
Pressure 
Increasing 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
3 Flow More 
Pressure 
Decreasing 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
4 Flow Reverse 
Flow 
Turbulence 
- - - Passive 
5 Temperature More 
LNG 
Evaporating 
BPCS - - - 
6 Temperature Less LNG Freezing BPCS - - - 
7 Pressure More Ruptured Pipe BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
8 Pressure Less Ruptured Pipe BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
LOPA worksheet can be found in attachment 3. 
4.4. SIS (SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM) DESIGN 
SIS design is made to meets the requirement IEC 61508 on Safety Life 
Cycle as guidance to SIS design. On this SIS design only has plan and 
design, do not continue to installation and operation stage, so it is only 
about analysis and realization. Data needed to complete this stage are 
some detail data about the LNG, specification of the storage tank, and 
the specification of loading pump. 
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4.4.1. Conceptual Process Design 
Research already was done on the Storage Loading facilities, especially 
on storage and loading liquid LNG. This unit has divided into some parts, 
which are Storage Tank, Liquid LNG Storage and Loading Pump that 
will carry the LNG to the last part (Berth or port) where the LNG 
transfers from onshore to the LNG vessel. The process occurs in storage 
that will proceed to the port through the pump as a medium that delivers 
the LNG through pipelines.  
Based on data process and specification, the flow chart on Storage 
Loading Facilities on Figure 2.13 is done. Conceptual design is 
completed, data is completed so the next step can ben done based on this 
conceptual design. 
4.5. VERIFICATION SIS (SAFETY INSTRUMENTED 
SYSTEM) 
The appropriate standard of IEC 61058 is a method on the Safety of Life 
Cycle as a guide to verify the SIS. By analyzing the SIL of the SIS is 
intended to determine the value of existing systems. Some numbers of 
failure factors as consider the existing system.  
4.5.1. Develop Safety Requirement 
Grouping the data into ESD (Emergency Shutdown) shows which 
equipment that will be active when the ESD system is activated. ESD 
group used are ESD I, ESD II, and ESD III as shown in Table 4.3 and 





Table 4. 3 ESD Final Element Indicated with “V” 
No Equipment Valve Type ESD1 ESD2 ESD3 
1 HV 6818-A Hydraulic - Gate valve v v  
2 HV 6818-B Hydraulic - Gate valve v v  
3 HV 6818-D Hydraulic - Gate valve v v  
4 HV 6819-1 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v  
5 HV 6819-2 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve v v  
6 HV 6832-A 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
 
 
Table 4. 4 ESD Final Element Indicated with “V” (continue) 
No Equipment Valve Type ESD1 ESD2 ESD3 
7 HV 6832-B 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
8 HV 6832-D 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
9 HV 6832-E 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve v v v 
10 HV 6833-A 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
11 HV 6833-B 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
12 HV 6833-C 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
13 HV 6833-E 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve v v v 
14 HV 68103-1 Solenoid - Gate valve v v v 
15 HV 68103-2 Solenoid - Gate valve v v v 
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Table 4. 5 Failure Rate 
N






















0 1.40 E-06 
5.00 E-
06 





0 1.10 E-07 
6.6-E-
07 





0 1.20 E-07 
5.30 E-
07 







0 1.40 E-07 
3.57 E-
06 







0 1.80 E-06 
5.20 E-
06 







0 3.80 E-07 
5.03 E-
06 







0 4.45 E-07 
7.27 E-
06 







0 1.89 E-06 
6.10 E-
06 







0 1.62 E-06 
6.31 E-
06 







0 2.36 E-07 
4.67 E-
06 







0 1.54 E-06 
5.58 E-
06 







0 2.05 E-06 
5.95 E-
06 



























0 6.52 E-06 
1.09 E-
05 
Table of ESD grouping also can be found in attachment 4 and 
failure rate table can be found in attachment 5. 
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4.5.2. Perform SIS (Safety Instrumented System) Conceptual 
Design 
To determine SIL need some calculation of SFF and PFD. Data 
were taken from failure rates Table 3.11. Based on ABB, he 
achievable SIL (Safety Integrity Level) is determined by the 
following safety-related parameters: 
o The fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put
the safety-related system in a hazardous or fail-to-function
state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure
Fraction) based on IEC 62061 as mentioned on equation
(2.1.).
For example, the calculation of HV 6818-A Hydraulic - Gate 
valve, data can be found on Failure Rate Table row 1. 
SFF = (λS + λDD)/(λSU + λDD + λDU) 
= (3.60E-06 + 0)/(3.60E-06 + 0 + 1.40E-06) 
= 72% 
As the calculation of Failure Rate shows on Table 4.5 mostly 
the value of the instrument capable of SIL means capable of 
using SIL 1 or 2, is not the instrument has a value of SIL 1 
or 2, capable only. With the conclusion of Table 4.4 shows 
that the amount of value SIL of each valve contained on the 
system ESD where value is dominated by the value of SIL 1, 
with a view maximum valve has a SIL 2, while based on the 
IEC standards for an industry major with a system that 
continuously as industry oil or gas should have a standard 
value for a field instrument with A type is capable of SIL 2 
or 3. Table 4.6 shows the calculation result based on the 
valve. 
63 
Table 4. 6 Calculation Result Based on Valve 
No Equipment SFF SIL 
1 HV 6818-A 72% 3 
2 HV 6818-B 83% 3 
3 HV 6818-D 77% 3 
4 HV 6819-1 96% 3 
5 HV 6831-A 65% 3 
6 HV 6832-B 92% 3 
7 HV 6831-D 94% 3 
8 HV 6832-E 69% 3 
9 HV 6833-1 74% 3 
10 HV 6833-A 95% 3 
11 HV 6833-B 72% 3 
12 HV 6833-C 66% 3 
13 HV 6833-E 96% 3 
14 HV 68103-1 96% 3 
15 HV 68103-2 40% 2 
o Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT)
In this unit, the valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) 
= 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve on ESD, 
which has 1/1, it means the use of the single channel, a single 
error that occurred can directly lead to device failure. The 
greater HFT number is better to the system because the 
failure that occurs will not directly lead to failure of the asset. 
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The Table of HFT (Hardware Fault Tolerance) shown in 
Table 4.7. 
Table 4. 7 Architecture Type A 
Type A 0 1 2 
< 60 % SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 
60 % < 90 % SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4 
90% < 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4 
> 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4 
o Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety
function on demand (PFDavg).
Determine the value of the PDF (probability of failure on 
demand) of the components that support the same safety 
system on the node. PFDavg value as the main element of 
the calculation, while the value obtained from the equation 
PFDavg meet the standard of the architecture of a system, 
because the ESD unit is activated via a push button that 
located in the control room storage loading facilities, With 
the flow of the Push Button - Logic Solver - Final Elements, 
then the system goes into the category of system 1/1 (1 out 
of 1) and the equation used to PFDavg mentioned on 
equation (2.2). 
For example, the calculation of HV 6818-A Hydraulic - Gate 
valve, data can be found on Failure Rate Table of Logic 
Solver. 
PFDavg = [1 (λDU x TI)] / 2 




Table 4.8 shows the PFDavg of the logic solver and Table 
4.9 shows the PFDavg of final elements. 
Table 4. 8 PFD Average of Logic Solver 
No Element Unit PFDavg 
1 Logic Solver Yokogawa Prosafe-RS 1.68E-06 
2 Push Button PB-Yokogawa Prosafe-RS 1.60E-05 
Total PFDavg = 1.68E-06 + 1.60E-05 
= 1.77E-05 
Table 4. 9 PFD Average of Final Elements 
No Equipment Pfdavg 
1 HV 6818-A 6.13E-03 
2 HV 6818-B 4.82E-04 
3 HV 6818-D 5.26E-04 
4 HV 6819-1 6.13E-04 
5 HV 6831-A 7.88E-03 
6 HV 6832-B 1.66E-03 
7 HV 6831-D 1.95E-03 
8 HV 6832-E 8.28E-03 
9 HV 6833-1 7.10E-03 
10 HV 6833-A 1.03E-03 
11 HV 6833-B 6.75E-03 
12 HV 6833-C 8.98E-03 
13 HV 6833-E 5.52E-04 
14 HV 68103-1 5.26E-04 
15 HV 68103-2 2.86E-02 
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The calculation by using Simplified Method need the equation 
mentioned on equation (2.3). 
And the total calculation of PFDavg Logic Solver and Final 
Element as shown below: 
PFD𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑆𝐼𝐹 = ∑PFD𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑆 + ∑PFD𝑎𝑣𝑔𝐹𝐸
= 5.40-03 + 1.77E-05 
= 5.42E-03 
Detail of calculation can be found in attachment 6. 
4.6. SIL (SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL) TARGET 
Based on these standards, the authors follow that the entire SIF, 
SIS on the system to be made must meet SIL 3 value in terms of 
architecture, design, and the level of security. And based on the 
calculation of SFF and PFD average the system meets the 
requirement of IEC stardard.  
67 
This Page Intentionally Left Blank 
ATTACHMENT I - DATA 
 
Figure 1. Overall PFD of SIS System 
 
Figure 2. PFD of Loading Facilities Storage Process 
 
Figure 3. PFD of Process Storage Tank & Loading Pump 
 
Figure 4. Piping and Instrument Diagrams for Storage Tank 
 
Figure 5 PFD of SIS on Storage Tank 
LNG FROM PROCESS PLANT
LNG TO LOADING PUMP












































































No Node Deviation Parameters 
1 Storage Tank Input No Flow No LNG in pipeline 
Less Flow Capacity of LNG less than 600.000BBL 
More Flow Capacity of LNG more than 700.000BBL 
Reverse Flow LNG is not through a Planned 
Less Pressure Discharge Pressure less than 4 bar 
More Pressure Discharge Pressure more than 8 bar 
Less Temperature Temperature of storage tank less than -
170oC 
More Temperature Temperature of storage tank more than -
120oC 
2 Storage Tank Process No Flow No LNG in pipeline 
Less Flow Capacity of LNG less than 600.000BBL 
More Flow Capacity of LNG more than 700.000BBL 
Reverse Flow - 
Less Pressure Discharge Pressure less than 4 bar 
More Pressure Discharge Pressure more than 8 bar 
Less Temperature Temperature of storage tank less than -
170oC 
More Temperature Temperature of storage tank more than -
120oC 
3 Storage Tank Output No Flow No LNG in pipeline 
Less Flow Capacity of LNG less than 600.000BBL 
No Node Deviation Parameters 
More Flow Capacity of LNG more than 700.000BBL 
Reverse Flow - 
Less Pressure Discharge Pressure less than 4 bar 
More Pressure Discharge Pressure more than 8 bar 
Less Temperature Temperature of storage tank less than -
170oC 










HAZOPS Worksheet for Node 1 “Storage Tank Input“ 
HAZOP STUDY 
RECORD SHEET 
PROJECT      : FRU 
Node            : 1 SYSTEM       : LNG Storage Tank 
P&ID : 
60 – GD – EF – oo1 “LNG 
Storage Tanks” 
 
EQUIPMENT / LINE TAG: 
LNG Storage Tanks (F-6001) 
Loading Pump (G-6801) 
 
DESIGN INTENT:  
 
No Deviation Causes Consequences Risk 
Ranking 
Safeguards Action Required 
    S L RR   





Empty pipe 2 2 A 
(4) 
PSV-6021 Ensure valve are 
open in the order 









4 2 C 
(8) 





No Deviation Causes Consequences Risk 
Ranking 
Safeguards Action Required 
    S L RR   





4 2 C 
(8) 







4 3 D 
(12) 





Ruptured pipe 2 2 A 
(4) 






Ruptured pipe 2 3 B 
(6) 




















HAZOPS Worksheet for Node 2 “Storage Tank Process“ 
HAZOP STUDY 
RECORD SHEET 
PROJECT      : FRU 
Node            : 2 SYSTEM       : LNG Storage Tank 
P&ID : 
60 – GD – EF – oo1 “LNG 
Storage Tanks” 
 
EQUIPMENT / LINE TAG: 
LNG Storage Tanks (F-6001) 
Loading Pump (G-6801) 
 
DESIGN INTENT:  
 
No Deviation Causes Consequences Risk 
Ranking 
Safeguards Action Required 
S L RR 




Empty tank 2 2 A 
(4) 
PSV-6022, PSV-
6023 and PSV-6024 
Ensure valve are 
open in the order 






Low Capacity 4 2 C 
(8) 
PSV-6021 Ensure XSV-8013 
and XSV-8014 are 
opened 






4 2 C 
(8) 
PSV-6021, CV-6001 Monitor the flow 
No Deviation Causes Consequences Risk 
Ranking 
Safeguards Action Required 





4 3 D 
(12) 
PSV-6022, PSV-
6023 and PSV-6024 
Monitor the flow 
5 Less 
pressure  
- Leakage on 
Tank 










- Leakage on 
Tank 



























HAZOPS Worksheet for Node 3 “Storage Tank Output 1“ 
HAZOP STUDY 
RECORD SHEET 
PROJECT      : FRU 
Node            : 3 SYSTEM       : LNG Storage Tank 
P&ID : 
(Number of drawing) “LNG 
Storage Tanks”; 
EQUIPMENT / LINE TAG: 
LNG Storage Tanks (F-6001) 
Loading Pump (G-6801) 
DESIGN INTENT:  
 
No Deviation Causes Consequences Risk 
Ranking 
Safeguards Action Required 
S L RR 
1 No Flow Empty 
Tank 
Empty pipe 2 2 A 
(4) 
PSV-6025 Ensure valve are 
open in the order 
2 Less flow - Pressure 
Increasing 
4 2 C 
(8) 
PSV-6025 - 
3 More flow - - - - - - - 
4 Reverse 
Flow 








Ruptured Pipe 2 3 B 
(6) 
PSV-5025 Monitor the 
pressure 
No Deviation Causes Consequences Risk 
Ranking 
Safeguards Action Required 








Ruptured Pipe 2 3 B 
(6) 







4 3 D 
(12) 





LNG Freezing 4 3 D 
(12) 









HAZOPS Worksheet for Node 4 “Storage Tank Output 2“ 
HAZOP STUDY 
RECORD SHEET 
PROJECT      : FRU 
Node            : 4 SYSTEM       : LNG Storage Tank 
P&ID : 
(Number of drawing) “LNG 
Storage Tanks”; 
EQUIPMENT / LINE TAG: 
LNG Storage Tanks (F-6001) 
Loading Pump (G-6801) 
DESIGN INTENT:  
 
No Deviation Causes Consequences Risk 
Ranking 
Safeguards Action Required 
S L RR 




Empty Pipe 2 2 A 
(4) 
PSV-6025 Ensure valve are 
open in the order 








4 2 C 
(8) 
PSV-6025 - 





4 2 C 
(8) 




- - - - - - - 
No Deviation Causes Consequences Risk 
Ranking 
Safeguards Action Required 




















Ensure the valve 







4 3 D 
(12) 





LNG Freezing 4 3 D 
(12) 
TE-6004 Monitor the 
temperature 
 
ATTACHMENT II – LOPA WORKSHEET 
Table 1. Storage Tank Input 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) - Storage Tank Input 









1 Flow None 
Empty Pipe 
 BPCS - - - 
2 Flow Less 
Pressure 
Increasing 
BPCS Alarm SIS - 
3 Flow More 
Pressure 
Decreasing 
BPCS Alarm SIS - 
4 Flow Reverse 
Flow 
Turbulence 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
5 Pressure Less 
Ruptured 
Pipe BPCS - - - 
6 Pressure More 
Ruptured 
Pipe 
BPCS Alarm - - 
7 Temperature Less 
LNG 
freezing 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
8 Temperature More 
LNG 
evaporating 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
 
Table 2. Storage Tank Process 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) - Storage Tank Process 








3 Layer 4 
1 Flow None Empty tank BPCS - - - 
2 Flow Less 
Low 
capacity BPCS Alarm SIS - 
3 Flow More 
Pressure 
decreasing 
BPCS Alarm SIS - 
4 Flow Reverse 
Flow 
Turbulence 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
5 Pressure Less 
Leakage on 
tank 
BPCS - - - 
6 Pressure More Leakage on 
tank 
BPCS Alarm - - 
7 Temperature Less 
LNG 
freezing 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
8 Temperature More 
LNG 
evaporating 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
Table 3. Storage Tank Output 1 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) - Storage Tank Output 











1 Flow None Empty pipe BPCS - - - 
2 Flow Less 
Pressure 
increasing 
BPCS Alarm SIS - 
3 Pressure Less 
Ruptured 
pipe 
BPCS Alarm - - 
4 Pressure More 
Ruptured 
pipe BPCS Alarm - - 
5 Temperature Less 
LNG 
freezing 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
6 Temperature More 
LNG 
evaporating 
BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
 
 
Table 4 Storage Tank Output 2 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) - Storage Tank Output 








3 Layer 4 
1 Flow None Empty pipe BPCS - - - 
2 Flow Less 
Pressure 
increasing BPCS Alarm SIS - 
3 Flow More 
Pressure 
decreasing 
BPCS Alarm SIS - 
4 Pressure Less 
Ruptured 
pipe 
BPCS Alarm - - 
5 Pressure More 
Ruptured 
pipe 
BPCS Alarm - - 
7 Temperature Less 
LNG 
freezing BPCS Alarm SIS Passive 
8 Temperature More 
LNG 
evaporating 
BPCS Alarm SIS Pasive 
ATTACHMENT IV – ESD TABLE 
Table 1 ESD Final Element Indicated with "v" 
No Equipment Valve Type ESD1 ESD2 ESD3 
1 HV 6818-A Hydraulic - Gate valve v v 
 
2 HV 6818-B Hydraulic - Gate valve v v 
 
3 HV 6818-D Hydraulic - Gate valve v v 
 
4 HV 6819-1 




5 HV 6819-2 




6 HV 6832-A 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
7 HV 6832-B 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
8 HV 6832-D 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
9 HV 6832-E 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
10 HV 6833-A 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
11 HV 6833-B 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
12 HV 6833-C 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
13 HV 6833-E 
Hydraulic - Butterfly 
valve 
v v v 
14 HV 68103-1 Solenoid - Gate valve v v v 
15 HV 68103-2 Solenoid - Gate valve v v v 
 
ATTACHMENT V – FAILURE RATE TABLE 
Table 1 Failure Rate Table 















1 HV 6818-A 
Hydraulic – Gate 
valve 8760 3.60E-06 0 1.40 E-06 5.00 E-06 
2 HV 6818-B 
Hydraulic – Gate 
valve 
8760 5.50E-07 0 1.10 E-07 6.6-E-07 
3 HV 6818-D 
Hydraulic – Gate 
valve 
8760 4.10E-07 0 1.20 E-07 5.30 E-07 
4 HV 6819-1 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 
8760 3.43 E-06 0 1.40 E-07 3.57 E-06 
5 HV 6819-2 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 8760 3.40 E-06 0 1.80 E-06 5.20 E-06 
6 HV 6832-A 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 
8760 4.65 E-06 0 3.80 E-07 5.03 E-06 
7 HV 6832-B 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 
8760 7.27 E-06 0 4.45 E-07 7.27 E-06 
8 HV 6832-D 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 
8760 4.21 E-06 0 1.89 E-06 6.10 E-06 
9 HV 6832-E 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 8760 4.69 E-06 0 1.62 E-06 6.31 E-06 
10 HV 6833-A 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 
8760 4.43 E-06 0 2.36 E-07 4.67 E-06 
11 HV 6833-B 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 
8760 4.04 E-06 0 1.54 E-06 5.58 E-06 















12 HV 6833-C 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 
8760 3.90 E-06 0 2.05 E-06 5.95 E-06 
13 HV 6833-E 
Hydraulic – 
Butterfly valve 
8760 3.39 E-06 0 1.26 E-07 3.52 E-06 
14 HV 68103-1 
Solenoid – Gate 
valve 
8760 3.21 E-06 0 1.20 E-07 3.33 E-06 
15 HV 68103-2 
Solenoid – Gate 
valve 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (3.60E-06 + 0)/(3.60E-06 + 0 + 1.40E-06)
= 72%






HV 6818-A = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6818-A Hydraulic - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (0.0000014 x 8760)] / 2
=
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6818-A Hydraulic - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure Rate 







VERIFICATION SIS (SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM) EQUIPMENT 2





λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (5.50E-07 + 0)/(5.50E-07 + 0 + 1.10E-07)
= 83%






HV 6818-B = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6818-B Hydraulic - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (1.10E-06 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6818-B Hydraulic - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure Rate 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (4.10E-07 + 0)/(4.10E-07 + 0 + 1.20E-07)
= 77%






HV 6818-D = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6818-D Hydraulic - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (1.20E-06 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6818-D Hydraulic - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure Rate 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (3.430E-06 + 0)/(3.43E-06 + 0 + 1.40E-07)
= 96%






HV 6819-1 = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6819-1 Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (1.40E-06 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6819-1 Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (3.40E-06 + 0)/(3.40E-06 + 0 + 1.80E-07)
= 65%






HV 6819-2 = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6819-2 Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (1.80E-06 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6819-2 Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (4.65E-06 + 0)/(4.65E-06 + 0 + 3.80E-07)
= 92%






HV 6832-A = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6832-A Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (3.80E-07 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6832-A Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (7.27E-06 + 0)/(7.27E-06 + 0 + 4.45E-07)
= 94%






HV 6832-B = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6832-B Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (4.45E-07 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6819-B Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (4.21E-06 + 0)/(4.21E-06 + 0 + 1.89E-06)
= 69%






HV 6832-D = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6832-D Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (1.89E-06 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6832-D Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (4.69E-06 + 0)/(4.69E-06 + 0 + 1.62E-06)
= 74%






HV 6832-E = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6832-E Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (1.62E-06 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6832-E Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (4.43E-06 + 0)/(4.43E-06 + 0 + 2.36E-07)
= 95%






HV 6833-A = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6833-A Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (2.36E-07 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6833-A Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (4.04E-06 + 0)/(4.04E-06 + 0 + 1.54E-06)
= 72%






HV 6833-B = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6833-B Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (1.54E-06 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6833-B Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (3.90E-06 + 0)/(3.90E-06 + 0 + 2.05E-06)
= 66%






HV 6833-C = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6833-C Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (2.05E-06 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6833-C Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (3.39E-06 + 0)/(3.39E-06 + 0 + 1.26E-07)
= 96%






HV 6833-E = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 6833-E Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (1.26E-07 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 6833-E Hydraulic - Butterfly valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (3.21E-06 + 0)/(3.21E-06 + 0 + 1.20E-07)
= 96%






HV 68103-1 = SIL 3
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 68103-1 Solenoid - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (1.20E-07 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 68103-1 Solenoid - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (4.41E-06 + 0)/(4.41E-06 + 0 + 6.52E-07)
= 40%






HV 68103-2 = SIL 2
1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SIL
Type A 0 2
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
Fox example the calculation of HV 68103-2 Solenoid - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure 
Rate Table
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1/1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 
will not directly lead to failure of the asset. Table 3.4 shows the standard of IEC 61508 for devices 
with type A.
SFF HFT
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 3
60 - 90% SIL 2 SIL 4
90 - 99 % SIL 3 SIL 4






SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
TI = Time Interval
= 1 year = 8760 hours
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (6.52E-07 x 8760)] / 2
=
Fox example the calculation of HV 68103-2 Solenoid - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure 
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λ^S = Failure Safe
λ^DD = Failure Danger Detected
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
SFF = (λ^S + λ^DD)/(λ^SU + λ^DD + λ^DU)
= (3.60E-06 + 0)/(3.60E-06 + 0 + 1.40E-06)
= 72%






1.3 Average probability of hazardous failures for a safety function on demand (PFDavg)
-1.2
where:
PFDavg = Probability on Failure Demand average
λ^DU = Failure Danger Undetected
TI = Time Interval






Fraction of failures that do not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or 
fail-to-function state (SFF). The equation used to find SFF (Safe Failure Fraction) based on IEC 
62061:
SIL 4
The valve has a Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) = 1, as meet the architecture standard of the valve 
on ESD which has 1oo1, it means the use of single channel, a single error that occurred can directly 
lead to device failure. The greater HFT number is better to the system because the failure that occurs 













SIL (Safety Integrity Level)







SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
SIL
PFDavg = [1 (λ^DU x TI)] / 2
= [1 (0.0000014 x 8760)] / 2
=
=
PFDavg = Yokogawa Prosafe-RS = 1.68E-06
PFDavg = = 1.60E-05
= 1.77E-05
Total PFDavg can be calculated by the equation below:
-1.3
where:
= PFD average of SIF
= PFD average of Logic Solver
= PFD average of Finel Element
= +







Fox example the calculation of HV 6818-A Hydraulic - Gate valve, data can be found on Failure Rate 
Table of Final Element
And the total calculation of PFDavg Logic Solver and Final Element as shown below:






CONCLUSION & RECOMENDATION 
 
Based on analysis, the conclusion got from the analysis and 
verification SIL (Safety Integrity Level) are: 
 
1. SIL of the asset meet the requirement, industry LNG 
should meet SIL 3 based on the IEC standard.  
2. Based on failure rate found some equipment has 1/1 that 
means one failure lead to another failure. The equipment 
are HV 68103-2 and HV 6833-C. 
3. Based on HAZOP some spot still has high potential of 
hazardous situation. Predictive maintenance will reduce 
the hazardous situation. By predictive maintenance the 
number of likelihood can be predicted and for severity can 
be increase because of the preventive action. 
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